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Abstract
Smartphone security is a growing concern. In this study, we use the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
to explore users’ attitudes, perceptions and behaviours towards the security of their work provided and
personal smartphones. Australian employees from an insurance company participated in in-depth semistructured interviews focussed on their behaviours. Data was analysed using deductive and inductive
thematic analysis, guided by PMT to explore the comparisons between personal and work devices. The
main overarching theme was that people behave more safely on their work smartphones compared to
on their personal smartphones. Results suggest that perceived vulnerability, perceived reward, response
cost, self-efficacy and social influence largely contributed to a lack of protective behaviours displayed
when using personal smartphones. Despite the safe behaviour reported for work smartphones, these
behaviours appear to be motivated by organisational controls, rather than intrinsically. This research
has applied implications for education, relevant to both personal and workplace contexts.
Keywords Smartphone, Work smartphone, Personal smartphone, Protection Motivation Theory,
Security behaviour.
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Introduction

The use of smartphones as a person’s sole device has seen a dramatic increase in recent years. The
number of smartphone users in the world surpassed 6.5 billion in 2022 (O'Dea 2022). The introduction
of smartphones has greatly enhanced user productivity and efficiency when performing daily tasks
including functions to aid the creation, sharing and consumption of content such as emails, social media
engagement, navigation and online banking. Similarly, this surge in smartphone adoption has been
reflected within organisational settings, enabling a new level of operational efficiency, benefitting
employers by having an increasingly connected workforce (Allam et al. 2014). This has introduced a host
of challenges for user information security (Allam et al. 2014; Verkijika 2018). For example, users are
often required to disclose personal information such as names, addresses, financial and other sensitive
details (Alsaleh et al. 2017). Therefore, while smartphones enable users to have a truly wireless, and
connected lifestyle, they can also pose significant security and privacy threats (Torre et al. 2018).
This study will explore how people behave on smartphones across settings, and whether setting
influences security behaviour. Specific research questions will focus on the extent to which people
employ the same security behaviours regardless of setting; and, to what extent can Protective Motivation
Theory (PMT) explain the use of smartphones across settings. Although PMT has been widely studied
in relation to smartphones, the influence of settings has not been examined. Throughout the following
sections, we present relevant literature outlining this important research gap.

1.1

Smartphone security

Due to the degree of sensitive information stored on smartphones, the theft of or access to a smartphone
could result in stolen identities, blackmail, extortion and the re-sell of the hardware (Alsaleh et al. 2017;
Clarke et al. 2016; Ophoff and Robinson 2014). There are also many ways that hackers can install
malware onto a victim’s device, gaining unauthorised access to sensitive information (Alsaleh et al.
2017). Recent research identified over 8.5 million malicious smartphone installation packages, 128,886
smartphone banking trojans and 261,214 ransomware trojans (Verkijika 2018).
Given these threats, one might assume that users would exercise extreme caution when operating and
securing their smartphones. However, the opposite has been found. Users are generally nonchalant in
their attitudes and behaviours towards smartphones and information security (Clarke et al. 2016).
Current research suggests that smartphone users are largely unaware of their susceptibility, and many
tend to ignore security mechanisms or feel that they are generally ineffective in preventing or reducing
the dangers and threats when using smartphones (Kusyanti and Catherina 2018; Wang et al. 2019). Not
only is this concerning f the general population, but it may be even more concerning for organisations
whose employees have access to personal and sensitive information who are often not adequately skilled
to ensure good security on their smartphones (Allam et al. 2014).

1.2

Protection Motivation Theory

A growing body of literature has focussed on why people might act in a dissonant manner and choose
not to protect themselves against cyber security threat or danger. This literature has been dominated by
the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), which can be used to explain the common disparity between
what a user thinks or knows they should do and their actual behaviour (Rogers 1975).
PMT consists of two cognitive processes, threat-appraisal and coping-appraisal, depicted in Figure 1.
Threat-appraisal considers the likelihood and impact of the risk, while coping-appraisal considers the
effectiveness of the adaptive response and the individual’s ability to perform this behaviour (Milne et al.
2000; Rogers 1983; Verkijika 2018). Each component is explained below.
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Perceived severity refers to how serious the individual views the threat or its consequences (Milne
et al. 2000; Vance et al. 2012). For example, Reeves et al. (2017) found that when asked about mobile
computing/IoT, employees who felt more personally at risk (e.g., of reprimand, personal data loss)
were more likely to avoid behaviours that may lead to the risk event.

2. Perceived vulnerability is the extent to which an individual believes they are susceptible to a threat,
or their perception of the probability of the threat actually occurring (Liang and Xue 2010; Milne et
al. 2000). With regards to smartphone security, this concerns a user’s perception about the
likelihood of their device being compromised (Verkijika 2018).
3. Perceived reward is associated with any perceived benefit to the user, such as saving time or money,
that motivates them to continue or even increase their maladaptive response. This means they may
disregard important protective behaviours (Vance et al. 2012).
4. Response efficacy refers to an individual’s belief that the coping response or protective behaviour
can help reduce the threat (Milne et al. 2000). In terms of smartphone security, it is the extent to
which an individual perceives that behaving securely effectively minimises the risk of a threat
occurring (Verkijika 2018).
5.

Response cost refers to the perceived cost associated with implementing the protective behaviour
(Vance et al. 2012). These can include money, time or effort required to perform protective
behaviours (Milne et al. 2000)

6. Self-efficacy is an individual’s level of perceived skill to perform the protective behaviour (Verkijika
2018). This can be conceptualised as ability or autonomy. Ability refers to how capable the individual
feels, and autonomy refers to an individual’s capacity to protect themselves against a smartphone
security threat (Sommestad et al. 2015b).
Evidence suggests that PMT constructs on average account for between 34 and 50 percent of the
variance in protective behaviour (Sommestad et al. 2015b; Thompson et al. 2017). For this reason,
researchers have also found evidence for additional variables such as social influence (Johnston and
Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009; Tu et al. 2014). This allows for the fact that people may act safely
because it is a social norm within a specific setting.

1.3

Previous research: PMT and information security

PMT has been applied to a range of information security populations (Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan
2015; Verkijika 2018), devices (Anderson and Agarwal 2010), and settings (Herath and Rao 2009; Lee
and Larsen 2009; Siponen et al. 2014). The majority of research has focused on organisational contexts,
and there has been some disagreement about the extent to which the findings are transferable to the
personal context (Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan 2015).
It has been suggested that work and personal contexts may differ in regards to the level of personal risk,
which may limit the applicability of PMT (Hovav and Putri 2016). The relevance of coping-appraisal
within organisational settings have also been questioned, due to behaviours being mandatory
(Sommestad et al. 2015b; Verkijika 2018). Recent criticisms are that home users do not have the same
security training or support, that they rely on often inadequate information sourced from family and
friends, that there is a greater requirement for self-reliance, and that they perceive their personal
information as not important enough to be targeted (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; McGill and
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Thompson 2017). Although the PMT has been used to examine information security behaviours in both
organisational and home contexts, as discussed in the next sections, to date the findings have been
mixed, and no study has compared smartphone security at work and home contexts.

1.3.1

PMT and information security in organisational settings

A large portion of the research on PMT and information security has been in organisational contexts,
often investigating employee compliance towards security policies. This research has commonly shown
that perceived severity had a significant positive impact on employees’ intention to comply with
information security policies (Herath and Rao 2009; Lee and Larsen 2009; Siponen et al. 2014). Other
findings are not as consistent. For example, while there is some evidence suggesting that perceived
vulnerability might influence employee intentions to comply with security policies (Lee and Larsen
2009; Siponen et al. 2014), there is also evidence suggesting it is not a significant predictor (Ifinedo
2012; Vance et al. 2012). Response efficacy has been found to have the strongest effect on compliance,
meaning that employees were motivated to adhere to policies if they believed there were high expected
returns (Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Lee and Larsen 2009). Perceived rewards have received
support within organisational settings. However, Vance et al. (2012) was the only study to find a
significant negative relationship, which is consistent with PMT. Most stable of these findings has been
that self-efficacy is consistently shown to influence employee intentions to comply with security policies
of their organisations (Herath and Rao 2009; Lee and Larsen 2009; Siponen et al. 2014).

1.3.2

PMT and information security in personal settings

The findings within the personal context are more consistent. Perceived severity was found to have a
significant positive relationship with security behaviours in a number of studies (Anderson and Agarwal
2010; Crossler and Bélanger 2014; Liang and Xue 2009; Martens et al. 2019). Similarly, there is
consistent evidence for perceived vulnerability and response efficacy having a significant effect on
protective behaviours (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler and Bélanger 2014; Hanus and Wu 2016;
Liang and Xue 2010). While some studies excluded response cost as a variable of interest, as it is
suggested security behaviours are not costly (Zhang and McDowell 2009), the studies that considered it
found support for its inclusion (Hanus and Wu 2016; Liang and Xue 2010; Thompson et al. 2017). Selfefficacy has also had consistent support within the literature (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Crossler and
Bélanger 2014; Hanus and Wu 2016). Perceived reward was excluded as a potential variable in all the
aforementioned studies.

1.3.3

PMT and smartphone security behaviours

PMT has also been used to study smartphone security behaviours, evaluating aspects such as theft or
loss (Tu et al. 2014), app permissions (Kusyanti and Catherina 2018), general smartphone security
(Verkijika 2018), and comparisons between smartphone and Personal Computing (PC) behaviours
(McGill and Thompson 2017; Thompson et al. 2017). Perceived severity and perceived vulnerability have
support within the literature (Thompson et al. 2017; Verkijika 2018), suggesting that smartphone users
employ protective behaviours if they feel vulnerable to threats, and if they perceive the threat to have
severe consequences. In line with other information security research, self-efficacy has the most support
within the PMT smartphone literature (Kusyanti and Catherina 2018; Thompson et al. 2017; Verkijika
2018). These findings suggest that users may lack awareness in how to appropriately and effectively
protect their smartphones (McGill and Thompson 2017).

1.4

Study aims

Referring to the evidence outlined throughout the previous sections, there is a substantial research gap
regarding understanding smartphone user security behaviour. Most notably, there is a lack of
understanding of smartphone specific security behaviours and the extent to which behaviours
performed within organisations transfer to home settings. Consequently, it is important to examine and
compare the behaviours of smartphone users within organisational and personal settings. For example,
it is not clear whether organisational policies and procedures within the workplace transfer to personal
smartphones. Therefore, the aim of this study is to understand how people behave on smartphones
across contexts, and whether context influences behaviour. Specific research questions explored as part
of this study were as follows: 1) to what extent do people employ the same security behaviours on
smartphones regardless of context? and, 2) can PMT be used to explain this comparison?
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Method
Participants

A total of ten (8 females, 2 males) working Australians (ranging from 34 to 56 years of age, M = 45,
SD = 7.81) participated in the interviews. Participants were all employed by an Australian insurance
company. All were employed full-time in various roles across the business, with a mix of internal and
external customer facing roles. Participants were required to be over the age of 18, currently employed
by the selected Australian insurance company, have a smartphone supplied by the organisation to assist
in their work duties, and also have a personal phone owned by the individual for use outside of work.
Participants were given pseudonyms, and any identifying information was removed.

2.2

Procedure

Participants were recruited internally through the organisation (i.e., advertisements and emails).
Interviews were semi-structured, with open-ended questions to avoid biased answers (Potter and
Hepburn 2005). Loosely based on survey questions from Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015),
Thompson et al. (2017) and Verkijika (2018), the interview questions focussed to how dual smartphone
owners used both devices in daily activities, the differences and similarities in use, and in regard to
protective behaviours. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim, using the
orthographic method advised by Braun and Clarke (2013).
Interviews lasted between 16 and 34 minutes (M = 25.8, SD = 5.82), and data saturation, as outlined by
Guest et al. (2006), was reached between the eighth and ninth interviews. A summary of the preliminary
themes was emailed to the participants for review as recommended by Tracy (2010).

2.3

Analysis

Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data, combining both inductive and deductive approaches.
This mixed approach enabled a robust and rigorous analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006),
following Braun and Clarke’s (2013) six-step guide. The first phase, familiarisation involved transcribing
the interviews while noting preliminary themes. The next few phases involved generating initial codes,
searching for and reviewing themes. This part of the analysis was deductive, with the PMT used to guide
the analysis. These themes were then reviewed against the data set as a whole. Data was then analysed
inductively in order to identify themes which did not align with PMT constructs. At this stage, crosschecking of the themes with other researchers was employed, as encouraged by Pope and Mays (2005)
to minimise researcher bias. Deductive analysis lead to the themes within PMT and inductive analysis
identified the additional theme ‘social influence’, which was then named. The final stage of analysis
involved selecting extracts from the data set that would provide vivid examples of the themes within the
model of PMT, and the additional theme relating to social influence (Braun and Clarke 2013).

3

Results

A key overarching theme identified from the data was that people behave more safely on their work
smartphones compared to on their personal smartphones. PMT was used to further explore this finding.
The participants did not ultimately know why they performed protective behaviours on their work
smartphones, or how the behaviours benefitted their security rather than their reputation within the
workplace. It seems people were behaving better due to the organisational controls and monitoring that
was in place to protect them, which do not exist within a personal setting. In regards to the PMT, it was
found that perceived vulnerability, perceived reward, response cost and self-efficacy within the personal
setting were major themes. Inductive analysis provided the additional theme relevant to the construct
‘social influence’, which considers influences towards smartphone security behaviour external to the
PMT model. The themes within this comparison will be explored in more detail below.
In this study, risky or maladaptive smartphone security behaviour included downloading third-party,
unofficial or pirated apps, choosing not to read privacy statements, accepting all permissions, using
public unsecure Wi-Fi, not using a passcode to lock the device, not backing up the devices data,
inappropriate use of social media (e.g. using unsafe surveys without reading privacy agreements). This
also included storing sensitive information on the smartphone without the correct precautions in place.
Participants unanimously reported behaving far safer on their work smartphones, in terms of refraining
from almost all of the listed behaviours when compared to their personal smartphones. Applying the
main factors within the PMT, the specific themes are explored below in greater detail.
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Perceived severity

When comparing attitudes, intentions and behaviours towards protecting smartphones, participants
perceived similar severity for their work and personal devices. Perception of severity was generally based
on purpose of use, and the information accessed or stored on the smartphone. For example, Cathy
indicated that her personal smartphone would have more severe consequences than her work
smartphone due to the personal information stored on the smartphone:
I’d say personal, yeah, because you’ve got a whole lot more stuff on there that impacts you and
your family and that sort of thing.
Aspects such as job role also seemed to influence perceptions of severity, as suggested by Dorothy:
…for me personally, I’d feel really horrible about client information being exposed because as
a professional, that’s part of our ethics, so that would make me really uncomfortable
professionally… I’d feel terrible.
This implies that the extent to which an individual feels personally responsible for the use of and
information accessed on the device determines how severe they perceive the threat. This was consistent
amongst participants on both personal and work smartphones.

3.2

Perceived vulnerability

A feeling of vulnerability, on the other hand, was perceived more frequently in relation to participants’
personal compared to their work smartphones. When discussing the use of the work smartphone,
participants indicated not feeling vulnerable because of their reliance and sense of trust in the technical
support they received through the organisation, as described by Pauline:
… well we get software updates, regularly, and that if I just keep those updates updated, that
whatever security is needed behind this phone happens. So I’m just assuming that it’s all
secure, anti-virus, everything is done to this phone because it’s a work phone, but I have no
idea what it is, or what they do, so I’m just assuming IT keep it up to date.
This feeling was shared by most participants who described IT support as extremely skilled, capable and
able to ‘shutdown’ (Cathy, Dorothy, Scott, Di) or ‘wipe’ – otherwise known as clear – devices (Amanda,
Cathy, Dorothy, Di) and ‘know exactly what to do’ (Dorothy, Daniella, Sam). As described by Pauline
above, participants indicated that this perception of company security practices reduced the need for
individuals to protect themselves.

3.3

Self-efficacy

Self-efficacy is conceptualised in terms of ability and autonomy (Sommestad et al. 2015a; Vance et al.
2012). Ability is described as knowing what to do, and autonomy is taking ownership and responsibility
of that behaviour (exemplified by Pauline, above). In the quote, below, Sam discussed her vulnerability
and lack of knowledge (i.e., ability) to protect her personal device:
Whereas my personal phone, oh gosh, what could I do, I don’t know, I don’t have a lot of control
over mine do I? No… I think, my work phone, IT department will sort it out for me, whereas
my own phone, I have to do it myself and I wouldn’t even know where to begin.
This suggests that participants do not have skills to protect their work smartphones, but rather, there is
support and stricter controls on use of smartphones. Participants did not often engage in risky behaviour
on their work smartphones. This included not connecting to unsecure Wi-Fi due to supplied data plans,
not engaging on social media, or downloading additional apps. The majority of the participants
acknowledged they purposefully and consciously decided to behave safely on their work smartphone, as
identified by Lisa:
… because I’m only using it for work related things, I don’t think I’m exposing the phone or
anything that’s on the phone in any way.
There are clear differences between smartphones regarding what is expected from a user. Protective
behaviours such as using a passcode and refraining from downloading unregistered apps were often
mandatory. However, some behaviours such as backing up the device or downloading and updating antiviral software were managed by IT, and were not the responsibility of the user, as Scott explained:
…the work phone was nice because it happened for me type thing, so I didn’t really have to do
anything, the updates came through and everything was forced and messages would come out
from the service desk to say ‘run this update’ and things like that, so it was a bit of less
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involvement, it was sort of done for you, so you know you could just ‘it’s broken fix it, send me
a new one’ whatever it is.
However, this was not the case for personal devices, which required the user to take personal
responsibility for all security behaviours. This may have contributed to participants’ inability to enact
such protective behaviours on their personal smartphones.

3.4

Perceived reward and response cost

Participants engaged in risky behaviour on their personal devices due to several reasons, but most
specifically, the response cost associated with protective behaviours and the perceived reward associated
with maladaptive responses. Often participants felt protective behaviours were ‘too costly’ (Cathy, Sam),
‘time-consuming’ (Daniella, Sam), ‘inconvenient’ (Scott, Cathy, Dave) and ‘boring’ (Lisa, Amanda,
Daniella, Sam). As described by Lisa when justifying not reading privacy statements:
[Interviewer – what are you gaining by not reading it?] time, haha, time yeah… and a lot of
it’s, it’s information overload, as well, like it’s small print, you know and is this going to tell me
anything that I’m not already assuming that you’re going to be doing?
Lisa identified the behaviour as not only costly, but also ineffective. Participants would often weigh up
cost and gains of maladaptive behaviour, as Dave explained in regards to connecting to unsecure Wi-Fi:
…I know and accept the fact that nothing is for free and that absolutely, and it’s the same for
apps as well, nothing is ever for free and they are always collecting data and numbers and
activity, from me … I know that they are doing that, but that’s the price I’m willing to pay
because it means I can watch a movie on my phone while I’m waiting for a flight.
It should be acknowledged, then, that participants commonly expressed being aware of when they were
doing the wrong thing, as explained by Daniella:
…probably another reason why I don’t download things on my work phone as well because
I’m not great at reading terms and conditions and I wouldn’t want to put something on there
that I haven’t read.
Participants seemed to be aware of maladaptive behaviours and restricted these on their work devices.
However, that was not the case for their personal smartphones. For example, Daniella admitted to
downloading numerous apps on her personal device without reading conditions or privacy statements:
…my personal phone I use all my apps, all my games… I probably should have read them, I
kind of probably just accepted them, um as I do with most things.
This might suggest the reason that participants lacked good behaviours on their personal devices was
due to the cost associated with those good security behaviours. For example, the time required to read
the terms and conditions.

3.5

Response efficacy

Despite displaying generally poor security behaviours on personal smartphones, when participants did
utilise a protective behaviour, they acknowledged that the behaviour was effective, as discussed by Lisa
when asked why she used a code to lock her personal phone:
...it’s just a good safeguard in case someone, you know I lose it, it’s locked, so somebody can’t,
hopefully, access it.
This was consistent amongst participants with regard to a variety of different security behaviours
(Amanda, Dorothy, Dave, Scott, Daniella). This suggests that to some extent training and educating have
been effective, and may have transferred to personal contexts.

3.6

Social influence

A concept that was beyond the scope of PMT was the role of social influence, subjective norm and
descriptive norm. Each of these concepts have been used in previous research as additional variables to
supplement the explanatory power of a PMT model (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen
2009; Tu et al. 2014). These variables suggest that there is some form of social influence on behaviour.
This was true in this study for both personal and work smartphones. When discussing the use of their
work smartphones, participants used phrases such as ‘being caught’, ‘monitored’, ‘corporate policy’,
‘embarrassing’, ‘be careful’, ‘don’t contradict the values’, ‘someone could potentially see it’, ‘security
conscious’ and ‘strict’ (Cathy, Scott, Daniella, Amanda, Dave, Pauline, Di, Sam). This suggests that
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participants were behaving safely because it was expected from them and they wanted to do the right
thing by the organisation, not necessarily because they were intrinsically motivated or because they
thought that security is important, as described by Daniella:
I think with the work phone as well, is I guess it’s not technically my property so at any time it
can be accessed by IT so you know it’s kind of like ‘oh I’m just going to restrict the information on
there’, Number one, I don’t ever want to contradict policy, and it’s probably just easier, keeps it
clean and keeps them very differentiated.
The idea of social influence can also be used to describe participants’ use of personal smartphones, and
the justification/explanation that engaging in risky behaviour is ok because ‘everybody does it’ (Scott,
Dave, Daniella, Lisa, Di, Cathy, Dorothy, Sam), as expressed by Amanda:
I don’t know why I’ve accepted it, I think because I see everyone else using it and so it’s like, oh
well, they think it’s fine, I’ll think it’s fine too…yeah, going by kind of herd mentality, and herd
immunity and figuring if there are now hundreds of people doing it, then the chances of me being
mucked over is lower because there’s 99 other people to pick.

4

Discussion

A large body of literature has explored aspects relating to PMT and information security behaviour.
However, despite the rapid adoption of smartphones, to date, no studies had compared user security
behaviour on work vs personal smartphones. Therefore, the aim of this study was to explore and
compare user smartphone security behaviour in personal and workplace contexts. The following
sections will discuss the study’s findings, applications, limitations and future directions.

4.1

Findings and implications

A key finding was that people employed more secure behaviours on their work compared to their
personal smartphones. To further explain this finding, we employed PMT and identified several
important themes. The strongest themes were perceived vulnerability, need for self-efficacy, perceived
reward and response cost. Also, there were no consistent significant differences regarding perceived
severity and response efficacy, and finally, inductive analysis identified the role of social influence on
both personal and work smartphones.
Participants generally felt that their personal devices were far more vulnerable to security threats. This
finding is not surprising, with limited support for perceived vulnerability within organisational settings
(Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Vance et al. 2012). Participants felt less vulnerable on their work
smartphones for several reasons. Firstly, participants used their work smartphones for a limited set of
specific work-related functions, such as phone calls and email communication. They did not engage in
risky behaviours on their smartphones due to lack of need and policy. This was also underpinned by the
idea that engaging in risky behaviours was linked to punishment, rather than good protective behaviours
being linked to benefits for the individual. Finally, the IT staff were responsible for the majority of the
security behaviours, leaving the participant feeling safe in the hands of IT. However, participants did
not have this safety-net on their personal smartphones, and frequently admitted to engaging in risky
behaviour such as not reading privacy statements, and connecting to unsecure Wi-Fi.
The concept of a safety-net also influenced self-efficacy on personal smartphones. This is contrary to
previous literature which identified a high need for self-efficacy within organisational settings (Herath
and Rao 2009; Lee and Larsen 2009; Siponen et al. 2014; Vance et al. 2012). In this study, participants
often considered themselves solely responsible for the protection and security of their personal
smartphones. Participants often acknowledged that the work smartphones had systems of support and
required less effort to maintain and look after (Butavicius et al., 2020). This meant that they did not
have to practice all protective behaviours on their work smartphones, and this may have transferred to
their use of their personal smartphones. It did not seem as though participants knew exactly how the
organisation protected the smartphones; therefore, this limited their ability and autonomy to perform
these behaviours themselves. From a practical perspective, if participants understood how the work
smartphone was protected and why, this knowledge and understanding might more readily transfer to
other contexts, such as how they use and engage with their personal device.
Participants often discussed perceived reward and response cost in the same manner. Despite being
defined as separate components and within separate appraisal processes, these have often been
operationalised as a single construct (Sommestad et al. 2015b; Thompson et al. 2017; Verkijika 2018).
When using their personal smartphone, participants often perceived some reward as a result of
performing risky behaviours such as connecting to unsecure Wi-Fi at airports. Similarly, the cost of
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performing protective behaviours was often a reason for not performing them on personal smartphones,
such as backing up data or reading privacy statements, which were considered too time consuming and
inconvenient. In sum, these components combined led to participants justifying their poor security
behaviour on personal smartphones. As has been suggested within previous literature, protective
behaviours are often mandatory within a workplace, and therefore participants would not consider
costs. Similarly, rewards may not have existed within this context, as performing risky behaviours such
as downloading unregistered apps would have contradicted policy and ultimately could have led to
dismissal. Rewards would not have out-weighed consequences within the work context.
The use of deductive analysis provided the final theme social influence. This concept has been identified
within previous literature, and suggests that individual behaviour is unavoidably influenced by
surrounding people (Tu et al. 2014). Inevitably, social networks play a major role in adoption of
protective behaviours (Liang and Xue 2009). Social influence can encourage compliance due to the need
for getting approval, acceptance or the fear of punishment (Liang and Xue 2009). This was certainly
found within our data, in terms of performing protective behaviours on the work smartphone. However,
social influence can also involve aligning one’s own values with that of the broader group, the
consequence of which resulted in performing risky behaviours on personal smartphones that may have
been recognised as socially desirable (Lee and Larsen 2009; Liang and Xue 2009). This therefore
suggests that variables such as perceived severity may have been affected by social influence.

4.1.1

Applied implications

The themes identified within the data offer several applied implications, particularly to the broader aim
of establishing good security behaviours and awareness in the general population. Firstly, it was not
explicitly discussed by participants, but it is important to note that the ultimate consequence of
performing risky or maladaptive behaviours on their work smartphones would have resulted in
dismissal from the workplace. The organisation had policies in place regarding internet usage,
smartphone usage and acceptable behaviour in the workplace. As mentioned throughout the analysis,
and particularly in relation to social influence – participants may have behaved safely from fear of
punishment or wanting to do the right thing (Myyry et al. 2009). From the perspective of the
organisation, this might be considered as a successful outcome. However, this could mean that instead
of using their work smartphones to do anything ‘riskier’, participants might perform this on their
personal smartphones, and then connect this to the workplace via email or other means. This could
inadvertently expose the organisation to risk they cannot control or avoid.
It must also be acknowledged that the participants within this study had participated in several
technology and cyber-security training courses within their workplace. The results of this study could
suggest that as a result of this training, participants behaved safely on their work smartphones,
complying with policy. However, it is interesting to note that this knowledge did not transfer to their
personal devices. Although employees behaved safely on their work smartphones, the lack of good
behaviour performed in the personal context suggests that the training was not fully effective. This might
indicate that participants did not ultimately know why they performed particular behaviours, or how the
behaviours benefitted their safety and security rather than their reputation within the workplace.

4.2

Limitations and future directions

While this study has provided a useful insight into the relationship between organisational and personal
smartphone security behaviours, it is not without its limitations. Firstly, the sample was limited to a
single workplace, which may be subject to bias. Future research should attempt to triangulate current
results, by for example considering workplaces and organisational settings, and those who specialise in
smartphone security and training (Tracy 2010). It should also be noted that the interviews were based
on self-report and in aid of convenience, were conducted within the workplace. It is possible then,
despite being made aware of confidentiality, that participants may have avoided admitting some poor
security behaviours performed on work-supplied smartphones. Finally, selection bias may have also
influenced participation in the study. Specifically attracting those who were confident in their work
smartphone usage, and discouraging participation from those who behaved poorly. It is also important
to note that this organisation had effective IT support, which may not be true of all organisations.
Considering the results of this study, it is suggested that future research could focus on education of
personal smartphone security. PMT guided analysis enabled a direct comparison and exploration into
which factors might influence adaptive and maladaptive security behaviour performed on personal and
work smartphones. It is, however, suggested that future research consider not only PMT, but variables
beyond the theory such as the role of social influence which was evident within our data. Future research
could focus on improving current training and education so that protective behaviours are transferred
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across contexts, as users understand the benefit to their organisation as well as personal security. Future
organisational education programs should emphasise the importance of security and secure behaviours
within the home and personal context. However, it is important here to consider cyber fatigue and not
overloading people with too much information on cyber-security (Reeves et al. 2021). This should be
essential in the development of successful education programs.

4.3

Conclusion

This study compared smartphone security behaviours of users on personal smartphones and work
supplied smartphones. Results indicated that participants behaved safer on their work compared to
their personal smartphones. Perceived vulnerability, perceived reward, response cost, self-efficacy and
social influence largely contributed to a lack of protective behaviour displayed on personal smartphones.
These findings have important theoretical and applied implications. Theoretically, while PMT provided
useful insight explaining the current findings, additional variables would certainly aid this investigation.
From an applied perspective, fear of penalty was linked to many of the themes, therefore it is suggested
that education programs within organisations focus upon the benefits of protective behaviours to
employees in both organisational and home contexts.

5
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